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Introduction
A recent worry amongst countries like the US and the EU is how the increased trade competition with countries like China is going to affect the incentives for firms to engage in R&D and other productivity improving investments. Increasingly countries like the EU and US turn to the use of trade protection such as Antidumping measures (AD) to protect industry specific factors in certain sectors. A recent phenomenon is that developing countries have also started to apply contingent protection which has resulted in a recent increase of bilateral trade protection mostly in the form of antidumping duties (Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2008 ).
While the model of monopolistic competition, increasing returns and firm heterogeneity has become one of the workhorse models in international trade, it is less suited to study issues of trade policy. The main reason is that its analysis in this setting is complex for unilateral trade policy let alone for bilateral trade policy as shown by Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) that consider the unilateral case.
In order to study the effects of bilateral trade protection on innovation, we turn to a very different type of model that does not consider firm heterogeneity within countries as in Melitz (2003) , but that does allow for heterogeneity across countries. The model's focus is on the analysis of strategic interactions between firms when productivity is decided endogenously rather than drawn randomly. For this purpose we augment the reciprocal dumping model (Brander & Krugman, (1983) ; Schmitt, Anderson and Thisse (1995) ) with a standard IO model on innovation (d 'Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1988) . In the first period firms can invest in productivity improvements and in the second period firms produce and sell differentiated products and compete in prices. Firms in this model sell both domestically and export abroad. First we consider how unilateral trade protection by a domestic country affects the incentives of domestic firm and foreign firm to innovate. Second we study innovation incentives when the foreign country follows suit and bilateral protection is in place.
Our results show that firm-level responses to unilateral and bilateral trade policy differs depending on firms' efficiency in innovation. Unilateral protection hurts the productivity of highly efficient domestic firms while it increases the productivity of lowly efficient domestic firms. High versus low productivity are defined in terms of cost of innovation. Bilateral protection reduces domestic R&D to a level that is lower compared to a situation where neither country takes protection. More in particular when one country uses trade policy to increase R&D, retaliation by a second country will lower R&D in the domestic country to a level that is lower than if it had never engaged in protection to begin with.
The endogenization of productivity has been the subject of many studies in industrial economics. Therefore our findings can also be related to some recent papers in that field like Boone (2000) and Aghion et al. (2005) . Both have shown that a firm's response to competition depends on its efficiency level. For instance, Aghion et al. (2005) show both theoretically and empirically that an increase in product market competition reduces innovation incentives for laggards.
In previous literature on innovation and trade protection, the maintained assumption was that firms in the model were symmetric (Gao & Miyagiwa, 2005 ) (G-M). In the absence of heterogeneous firms, G-M show that firm-level R&D investments across countries are always strategic substitutes. Our model extends G-M by introducing heterogeneity in innovation efficiency across countries and has a broader set of predictions. We find that R&D investments can either be strategic substitutes or strategic complements depending on firms' ability to innovate. G-M find that unilateral trade protection always lowers the incentive of the protected firm to innovate, and bilateral protection always spurs firm-level R&D of firms in both countries compared to free trade. Our model encompasses the results of G-M but at the same time we obtain various possibilities for the effects of trade policy on firmlevel R&D investment. More specifically, our findings show that while unilateral trade protection spurs innovation of lowly efficient firms, it reduces innovation of highly efficient firms. When protection of lowly efficient firms by one country results in retaliation by another country, the net effect on the first country's firm-level R&D is always negative.
Our theoretical findings correspond well with recent empirical findings of Konings and Vandenbussche (2007) . Empirically they show that the effects of antidumping protection on productivity of firms depend on firms' initial productivity. They find that "frontier" firms with a high initial productivity lower their productivity during trade protection while "laggard" firms with a low initial productivity firms increase productivity during protection.
Another way to interpret our results is to think of a lowly efficient innovator as a firm in a developing country and a highly efficient innovator as a firm in a developed country. Recent empirical evidence has shown that in certain sectors notably "Apparel, textiles" and "Footwear", a number of countries notably China have closed the productivity gap with countries like the EU and the US (Fadinger and Fleiss, 2008 ). This observation is in line with the predictions of our model that suggests that in sectors where developed countries have lost their edge in innovation there exists an incentive to protect domestic industries. Our model also yields insights that are in line with the predictions by Acemoglu et al. (2003) . They find that more 'backward' economies have stronger incentives to limit product market competition in order to move closer to the world technology frontier. This paper is by means in favor of trade protection. The recent proliferation wave of trade protection laws amongst developing countries implies that retaliation is now much more likely than ever before. One of the important results arising from our analysis is that in the face of retaliation domestic R&D is lower compared to a situation where neither country takes protection. Our model predicts that the prospect of retaliation reduces the incentive for traditional users of trade protection laws to use protection in the first place. We present some casual evidence in line with this prediction.
In section 2 we set up the model. Section 3 deals with the analysis of unilateral protection while section 4 discusses bilateral protection. Results are discussed in section 5 and section 6 concludes. 
Theoretical Model
where α is the parameter pertaining to demand function and is normalized into 1 without loss of generality, and β is the degree of differentiation between the products produced by the firms, we assume 0 1 β < < so the products are substitutes.
The second-stage (product market) game
In 
for the domestic market and
for the export market.
Eqs. (4) and (5) 
where we denote with ( ∧ ) the values pertaining to the benchmark equilibrium.
In this model there is reciprocal dumping, implying that each firm dumps into each other's market. The dumping margin is defined as the difference between the exfactory export price * a B p t − and the home price a p of the product. The ex-factory price is the theoretical price of the product of country a as it leaves the factory or put differently it is the price charged by a in the export market after deducting all the costs related to entering its export market b ( * a p -B t ). Thus, the dumping margin is defined as.
It is easy to show that the dumping margin is positive for firm a, or ¶ 
which generally holds provided A t is not too different from B t . It implies that the dumping margin is an increasing function of β (decreasing in product differentiation)
suggesting that less product differentiation leads firms to compete more intensively and to more aggressively dump into each other's home market.
Substituting the equilibrium prices into the profits function, we have firm a 's 
Eqs. (10) and (11) show that, in both the domestic market and the export market, the market share of firm a decreases with its own marginal cost and increases with the marginal cost of its competitor. That implies that firm a has an incentive to conduct cost-reducing R&D investment to expand its market share.
The first-stage (R&D) game
Substituting a a c c g = − into the equilibrium profit (9) and equilibrium output level (10), (11) yields the following expressions of them as functions of R&D
and the corresponding equilibrium output levels are In this stage, the firms simultaneously and independently choose R&D investment levels, a g and b g , to maximize overall profit ¶
where the second term on the RHS is the quadratic R&D cost function taken from d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) , in which the quadratic form is used to model the nature of decreasing return to scale on innovation (the increasing difficulty to obtain innovation). That is, to obtain an innovation (a reduction on marginal production cost) 
Let (16) be equal to 0, and from this first-order condition we have that at the optimum: Intuitively this implies that how firm a reacts to a change on its foreign competitor b's R&D investment depends on how efficient firm a is in innovation. Or put differently when firm a finds it easy to innovate, an increase in firm b's R&D levels will induce it to do the same. This is what is referred to as strategic complementarity of R&D. However, when firm a has a weak capacity to innovate as it faces high costs of innovation, an increase in firm b's R&D level will meet a decrease in the R&D level of a. This is referred to a strategic substitutability.
When firms have the same efficiency in innovation, a b γ γ = , firm-level R&D investments are strategic substitutes as shown by Gao & Miyagiwa (2005) . But once allowing for heterogeneity in innovation efficiency between firms, there is a threshold value, γ , that delineates R&D complementarity from R&D substitutability. This threshold value on the innovation efficiency parameter varies with the parameter of product differentiation, β . As products become more similar (increasing β ), this threshold value γ delineating R&D complementarity from substitutability decreases, as depicted in Fig.1 . 6 Or, as β gets closer to 1, the R&D investment of each firm is 5 This threshold value is not related to the innovation efficiency parameter of its competitor. This property is robust with ad valorem and Iceberg transport cost function. 6 The range of β is between 0 and 1, and the range of γ is between 4/9 and 1. That is, when β equals to 0 (with the highest level of product differentiation), the corresponding value of γ is 1; with the increase of β , γ decreases, when β reaches 1 (with the lowest product differentiation), the corresponding value of γ is 4/9. more likely to be strategic substitute for each other when the products are more different. The economic explanation is straightforward: with higher degree of product differentiation, firms compete less intensely. Intuitively this implies that when a domestic firm faces a tariff in its export market it will increase its R&D provided it is a good innovator meaning the cost of innovation is low. And the opposite holds when the domestic firm is a bad innovator.
In that case a tariff abroad will reduce its R&D levels. This is what we call the direct effect. The second part of the Lemma deals with the situation where a domestic firm is protected by a domestic tariff against imports from abroad. In this case the domestic firm has an incentive to increase its R&D spending but only in the case where it is a bad innovator. And the opposite holds when the domestic firm has a low cost of innovation. This is what we call the indirect effect. When country A imposes a tariff on imports from B, the tariff A t is not directly targeted at the firm in A, but it has an indirect effect on firm A's R&D choice via its competitor B's R&D choice.
It can be easily verified that in terms of magnitude, a tariff abroad sorts more effect on R&D levels than a domestic tariff. Or put differently, the direct effect on R&D dominates the indirect effect which can be seen from (19). 
We have the equilibrium level for firm b simply by interchanging the subscripts a and b in (20). By substituting the equilibrium R&D investment levels into the previous functions, we immediately obtain the equilibrium outputs and profits. But in the remainder of the paper we focus on R&D incentives and we evaluate the impact of (unilateral and bilateral) trade protection on them.
Unilateral Trade Protection
First, we analyze the effect of unilateral trade protection, that is, when only one country adopts trade protection. Without loss of generality, we assume it is country A that increases its tariff A t against imports from country B.
Under unilateral protection by country A we assume this tariff is not prohibitively high for the firms from country B to keep exporting in the presence of trade protection.
For the remainder of the analysis, in particular Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are important. From Lemma 1 we know that when country A imposes a tariff against imports, the R&D effect on its own firm in A depends on its efficiency in innovation.
If the firm in A is an efficient innovator, the protection will lower its R&D spending, but if the firm in A is a "laggard" and innovation is costly, the tariff will increase its R&D. In terms of the R&D of the trade partner, Lemma 1 tells us that R&D response by the foreign firm in B to trade protection by country A also depends on the innovation efficiency of the firm in B. If the firm in B is an efficient innovator it will increase its R&D spending when facing protection in its export market. However, when the firm in B is a lowly efficient innovator, trade protection by country A will reduce its R&D spending.
Finally, Lemma 2 points out that the effect in terms of R&D investment change of tariff protection by country A in equilibrium will be stronger for the firm in B than for the firm in A. This is important for the graphical analysis we pursue below since it limits the relative magnitude of the shifts of firms' best response functions due to trade protection by A.
Thus, conditioned on the innovation efficiency of firms, we have several possible configurations as demonstrated below.
3.1.) Unilateral Protection: "Developed versus Developed"
We first consider the case where both firms in both countries A and B are efficient 
3.2.) Unilateral Protection: "Developed versus Developing"
Next we turn to the case where country A is a developed country with the firm in 
3) Unilateral Protection: "Developing" versus "Developed"
For completeness we also want to consider what happens in the case where country A is a developing country with low innovation efficiency would use unilateral trade protection against a developed country B with high innovation efficiency. The analysis would be exactly the opposite as the one described in the section above (3.2.). Unilateral protection by the developing country A would increase R&D of its domestic firms and also increase R&D spending of firms in B.
3.4.) Unilateral Protection: "Developing versus Developing"
Finally let us consider the case where both countries have high costs of innovation, This can be thought of as two developing countries competing with each other. From Proposition 1 we know that in such a case for each firm the R&D investment of its competitor is a strategic substitute for its own R&D investment and best response functions are decreasing. Thus firm a and firm b have their reaction functions depicted as in Fig.2 .c, in which E is the original equilibrium under free trade (the benchmark case). With unilateral trade protection imposed by country A, the firm in B's reaction curve moves inward (left-ward), and firm a 's reaction curve moves outward (rightward). Thus we have a new equilibrium, in which the firm in A increases its investment on R&D while the firm in B decreases its R&D investment.
Bilateral Trade Protection
After considering unilateral protection by country A, we now turn to the scenario of bilateral protection in which country B follows suit and also adopts an import tariff of the same level that is A B t t = . Again we assume this tariff is not prohibitively high and allows all firms to continue exporting even in the presence of bilateral trade protection. Obviously this is a simplifying assumption but it allows us to easily distinguish the effects of unilateral versus bilateral protection.
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From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 we know that a tariff by country B increases the R&D level of firm b if and only if the firm in B is lowly efficient in innovation. The effect on firm a of a tariff by B also depends on the innovation efficiency of the firm in A. If the firm in A is a highly-efficient innovator a tariff by B will raise its R&D levels otherwise it will lower them. Moreover, we know that the direct effect dominates the indirect effect. That is, for the firm in A, the effect of a tariff by B on its R&D dominates the effect of a domestic tariff imposed by country A. and similarly for the firm in B. Thus, conditioned on the innovation efficiency of firms, again we have several configurations as demonstrated below.
4.1.) Bilateral Protection: "Developed versus Developed"
If both countries are developed countries and efficient in innovation, firms' best response functions are upward sloping as depicted in Fig.3 .a. Starting from the 8 In this paper we do not go in search of the first-best type of trade policy. The symmetry we assume largely simplifies things and allows us to focus on R&D incentives. 
So with the adoption of trade protection by a developed country B, the firm in A increases R&D investment while the firm in B reduces R&D investment. However, the total R&D investment level is greater for both firms compared to that under the benchmark case in the absence of any AD. Thus the net effect of bilateral trade protection on R&D is positive for both firms.
4.2.) Bilateral Protection: "Developed versus Developing"
Now let us suppose that country A is a developed country with a firm in A that is highly efficient in innovation while the firm in B is not. Thus firm in A and the firm in B have their reaction functions depicted as in Fig.3 .b. We start from the unilateral protection scenario in which only country A adopted trade protection. When a developing country B that hosts an inefficient firm retaliates and adopts protection,
i.e., increases t b , the reaction curve of the firm in B shifts back (right-ward), the new one is " b R ; and the reaction curve of the firm in A shifts back (up-ward) as well and
overtakes the original reaction curve a R , the new reaction curve is " a R . Thus we have the corresponding equilibrium under bilateral trade protection, " E , in which 
So with the adoption of trade protection by country B, the firm in A reduces R&D investment while the firm in A increases R&D investment. However, the R&D investment level under bilateral
protection is lower for both firms compared to that under free trade. Thus the net effect of bilateral trade protection is negative for both firms.
We summarize all the previous results in the following table. Using arrows in Table 1 we indicate the direction of R&D investment in the firm in A and the firm in B under different trade policy scenarios: unilateral trade protection and bilateral trade protection. The last row indicates the "net effect" that is the total amount of R&D per firm compared to the benchmark equilibrium. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Note: When country A liberalizes this is a reduction of compared to the benchmark equilibrium. When country A protects this is an increase in compared to the benchmark equilibrium. When B retaliates this implies that we compare firms' responses to the unilateral protection equilibrium. The "Net effect"
row implies that we compare firms' responses under bilateral protection to the benchmark equilibrium.
Discussion of Results and Implications
Our results show that the effects of trade protection on firm-level R&D differ across firms. While unilateral trade protection by country A can boost productivity of lowly efficient firms in A (cells 5a and 7a), it hurts the productivity of highly efficient firms in A (1a and 3a) .
Interestingly, in those cases where unilateral trade protection boosts R&D efforts of domestic firms, once retaliation is allowed for and bilateral protection kicks in, these same domestic firms loose. This can be seen from the "net effect" at the bottom of column 5 and 7 in Table 1 . Hence, while a country may be inclined to protect its lowly efficient firms through antidumping protection, retaliatory action by a trade partner implies that the net amount of R&D spending will be lower than under the benchmark equilibrium in the absence of any antidumping protection. Results in Table 1 would suggest that in the absence of any retaliation, countries may be inclined to use unilateral (AD) protection to boost R&D investment of domestic firms in industries where they lag behind in innovation ability. However, once retaliation becomes a distinct possibility, countries are more likely to refrain from using antidumping protection since the results in Table 1 show that R&D efforts under bilateral protection are below benchmark levels.
The recent proliferation of Antidumping laws especially amongst developing countries has substantially increased the retaliatory power of these developing countries (Prusa, 2001) . Zanardi (2004) reports that while 37 countries had an AD law in 1980, this number increased to 93 countries by the end of 2000 including countries like Mexico, China, India, Taiwan, Turkey, Peru, Egypt etc. to name just a few. The proliferation does not seem to be confined to any particular region but includes developing countries from Asia, Latin-America and former Eastern Europe and seems to be primarily driven by retaliation motives. That is, especially those countries that in the past were subject to antidumping duties in their export markets seem more likely to pass trade protection laws of their own (Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2008) . Before the diffusion of Antidumping laws took off, there were only a handful of countries using AD protection unilaterally. They involved the US, EU, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The countries these traditional users targeted mainly involved less developed countries in Latin-America, Asia and former Eastern-Europe. At that time these traditional users of antidumping did not face much risk of retaliation and cases were plentiful. However, in recent years the number of AD initiations by the traditional users seems to have slowed down. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . Around the same time as the AD initiations by the "new users" of AD started to shoot up as indicated by the dotted line, we observe a slowdown in the number of AD cases initiated by the traditional users as indicated by the full line. ii) all other users: a complete list of all new users can be found in Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008) This slowdown of AD cases by traditional users is in line with the predictions of our model. Based on our findings we would expect that when retaliation becomes a distinct possibility there will be less AD protection initiated by the traditional users in the first place.
Conclusion
This paper looks at the interaction of trade policy and firms' incentives to innovate.
We use a two-country two-firm model with firms in each country both selling at home and exporting abroad. Our results suggest that countries whose domestic firms lag 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Traditional users All other users where neither country takes protection. Therefore based on our model we would expect a slowdown in the number of antidumping protection cases by traditional users. A casual look at the data seems to support this prediction.
